Ordained Servant: The Orthodox Presbyterian Church

Almost every assertion about the recent past needs to be qualified by “once upon a time.” That seems to be especially true for the claims in 1955 that Will Herberg, a theologian-turned sociologist and editor at National Review, made about religion in the United States. Because survey data showed that 68 percent of Americans were Protestant, twenty-three Roman Catholic, and four Jewish, Herberg concluded that “to be an American today means to be either a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew, because all other forms of self-identification and social location” are “peripheral,” “obsolescent,” or merely parts of a larger “religious community.” He added that “not to be a Catholic, a Protestant, or a Jew today is, for increasing numbers of American people, not to be anything.”

Within a decade many scholars of religion were already questioning Herberg, but today the idea that the major Western religions could give a measure of meaning to the American people seems preposterous. The recent rise of people who do not identify with any religion, so-called “nones,” makes Herberg’s America look like a vintage postcard. Explanations for the increase of “nones” are varied and many—most having some affinity to theories of secularization—but atheists, agnostics, and others, those who describe their religion as “nothing in particular,” are increasingly the object of scholars who study American society. According to recent data from the Pew Research Center, “about 28% of U.S. adults are religiously unaffiliated, describing themselves as atheists, agnostics or ‘nothing in particular’ when asked about their religion.” For scholars who correlate religion to civic responsibilities, these results are noteworthy. The Pew study notes that “‘Nones’ tend to vote less often, do less volunteer work in their communities and follow public affairs at lower rates than religiously affiliated people do.”[1]

“Nonverts” is a descriptor that adds a further layer to this trend of no religious identity. In his new book, Stephen Bullivant, a British academic with doctorates in both theology and sociology, uses polling data and interviews to describe people who have switched from religious somethings to religious nothings. These Americans do not merely choose “none” in social surveys about religion but do so after having grown up with some religious beliefs—hence “nonvert.” Bullivant estimates that forty-one million Americans fall into the category of “nonvert.” Roman Catholics account for the most—sixteen million, followed by seven and a half million ex-Baptists, two million ex-Methodists, two million ex-Lutherans, one million ex-Episcopalians, and one million ex-Presbyterians. These numbers indicate that of all the “nones” in the United States, only 30 percent grew up without religion. For those doing the math, that means that 70 percent of those who no longer affirm a religious identity came from identifiable religious backgrounds (9).

To the author’s great credit, these statistics, which could be alarming on several levels, do not become fodder for predicting the end of civilization. Bullivant is cautious about the data, because he knows how unreliable polling surveys can be. For instance, he cleverly describes how thick religious ties may be in comparison to what social survey instruments measure. One interview with an American Roman Catholic revealed a person of Irish descent, baptized and confirmed in the church, who does not observe the faith, attends family weddings and funerals, admits to praying “a Hail Mary” when her child was hospitalized, makes a big deal of St. Patrick’s Day—drinking Guinness, and “dyeing the Chicago River green. Bullivant then asks, “how do you distill all that down to a single tick-box in reply to ‘What’s your religion?’” (51). Depending on the question or even the time of day, a person might respond one way on one day and a different way a week later. In sum, social surveys reveal numbers that appear to be precise but that are influenced by a host of factors that make them highly impressionistic. A survey is “the combined product of both an actual empirical reality and the precise methods used to try and measure it.” This means “no Platonic Form of the Ideally Worded question” exists and that “better and worse methods” do exist for attempting to measure certain social trends (53).

With that glance at the way the sausage is made, Bullivant is still emphatic that “nonvert” is an important development in America. For those with the eyes of ecclesiology to see, the question is one of membership or belonging. How much do American believers identify with religious institutions, how do they pass on such patterns of belonging to children, and to what degree has religion become either a highly personal affair (without requirements for membership) or so much part of an individual’s experience that people leave faith and recover it the way customers change Internet Service Providers.

However imprecise the seemingly scientific measurements of the American people, the demographics of “nonverts” suggest important changes within the last thirty-five years. The largest group of nones fall in the ages of twenty-five to thirty-four (39 percent of the total). Among this group, almost two-thirds are “nonverts,” the highest of any age group. The second highest number registers in the ages thirty-five to forty-four, where 75 percent grew up in religious homes (20 percent of the total). On descriptors of race, sex, education, and politics, “nonverts” do not deviate significantly from the rest of the population, though Bullivant does remark that “nones” are “predominantly White, affluent, and well educated” (71). What is striking among “nonverts” is the ongoing affirmation of religious belief. Thirty-five percent of “nonverts” believe in a higher power, and roughly 20 percent “know” God exists, “no doubt about it” (65). When it comes to beliefs about life after death, 55 percent of “nonverts” believe life does not end with death, over 45 percent believe in heaven, close to 40 percent in hell, and over 40 percent in miracles (69). These statistics show the effects of growing up religious.

For all the curious features of the data, the statistics about age are striking and lead the author to venture into the lane of historical explanations. Why have younger generations left religion? For instance, Baby Boomers make up only 16 percent of the total “nonverts,” not exactly the expected number for Americans with a reputation for opposing the Vietnam War, experimenting with drugs and sex, and distrusting anyone over thirty years old. Here, Bullivant notices changes in American nationalism, foreign policy, and the Cold War. During its forty-five year struggle with Soviet Communism, going to church or synagogue was easy and expected. Indeed, part of America’s boasted superiority was its religious character. Being a good American went hand in hand with being a believer—especially a Protestant one. “Cold War oppositions between ‘godless communism” and ‘Christian America,’” Bullivant observers, “engendered a Pavlovian association between being un-religious and being un-American” (124).

Even after Protestants and Roman Catholics began to adjust to the cultural “revolution” of the 1960s, their members and children were used to thinking of themselves as Christian, even if not as narrowly as before. Once the Cold War ended, the cultural affinities between being Christian and being a good American weakened dramatically. With this situation came a growing number of people who were dissatisfied with the religion of their youths and found (courtesy of social media) that other people also looked at faith skeptically and were willing to drop religion. Cultural conditions post-Cold War made it easier to become irreligious than it had during the earlier era.

As simplistic as this summary of Bullivant’s explanation (based on data) may sound, the book makes a bigger and important point about the importance of belonging to a group and how membership sustains conviction. For some, this observation falls in the domain of social psychology. Christians might object because such analysis neglects the mysterious and supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. But the Christian equivalents to social psychology are ecclesiology, biblical teaching about the body of Christ and the importance of being a member (arm, eye, foot) in the body of Christ (with Christ as head). Whether we consult social scientists or practical theologians, both are noticing how group dynamics reinforce belief.

Where Bullivant goes beyond either social psychology or ecclesiology is American history. For much of the twentieth century, mainline Protestantism “was the religious equivalent of an IBM.” Bullivant writes, “You knew what you were getting, and you didn’t need to have a special reason, whether of ethnicity or religious conviction, for getting it.” He adds that the “mainline’s power came from its close cultural, political, and moral fit with the mores of America” (86–87).

Of course, as critics of and exiles from mainline Protestantism, Orthodox Presbyterians were never comfortable with the cultural Christianity that dominated the mainline denominations. At the same time, as Christians living in the United States where generic Christian moral norms prevailed, Orthodox Presbyterians benefitted from the mainline’s influence on American institutions. Those benefits are even more obvious now that many serious Christians and Jews not only are unsupported but also find open hostility to their convictions from public institutions.

Nonverts is a thoughtful book that should provoke readers to ponder the way churches and denominations encourage members to be faithful. Perhaps even more importantly, Bullivant’s book will prod church officers and members alike to consider where the younger generations of Orthodox Presbyterians are landing in their own spiritual quests.

Endnote

[1] Religious ‘Nones’ in America: Who They Are and What They Believe," Pew Research Center, January 20, 2024; https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/01/24/religious-nones-in-america-who-they-are-and-what-they-believe/.

Darryl G. Hart is distinguished associate professor of history at Hillsdale College in Hillsdale, Michigan, and serves as an elder in Hillsdale Orthodox Presbyterian Church in Hillsdale, Michigan. Ordained Servant Online, August–September, 2024.